GARTNER.DOC

1/13/2011 7:04 PM

BEYOND THE MONOPOLY OF STATES
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ABSTRACT
In the twenty-first century, a wide range of complex global
challenges will require unprecedented levels of global cooperation
between states and non-state actors. Yet few leading international
institutions today are designed to effectively leverage the
resources, ingenuity, and connectivity of diverse societal actors.
While some scholars maintain the view that civil society should not
meaningfully participate in the governance of international
institutions, a new generation of multi-stakeholder institutions
points to a new way of understanding the relationship between
non-state actors and international institutions.
This article
examines the role of civil society in the governance of international
institutions and highlights this new generation of multistakeholder institutions that involve non-state actors as full
participants in governance. It applies insights from work on
associative democracy to suggest a new approach to evaluating
civil society participation within international institutions.
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INTRODUCTION

In the twenty-first century, a wide range of complex global
challenges will require unprecedented levels of global cooperation.
However, most of the international institutions we inherited from
the last century were designed only to promote cooperation among
states in the context of a very different world in the wake of World
War II. Sixty-five years later, many of today’s biggest challenges
can no longer be managed or solved by states alone, but instead
require the resources, ingenuity, and connectivity of diverse
societal actors. A new generation of institutions is increasingly
harnessing the energies of civil society organizations 1 and other
non-state actors through multi-stakeholder forms of governance.
The governance of international institutions and the expanding
role of these institutions in responding to key global challenges has
become a resurgent area of research interest. 2 However, a number
1 See John Gerard Ruggie, Reconstituting the Global Public Domain—Issues,
Actors, and Practices, 10 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 499, 522 n.1 (2004) (defining civil society
organizations (“CSOs”) as “transnational social movements, coalitions, and
activist campaigns as well as formal non-governmental organizations”).
2 See generally JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAWMAKERS (2005); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 10, 18 (2004);
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International
Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 29 (1998); Kenneth Anderson, Book Review:
Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Governance Through Global
Government Networks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1311 (2005); Daniel Bodansky, The
Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International
Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596 (1999); Steve Charnovitz,
Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 348, 372
(2006); Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing
Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J 1490 (2006); Andrew T. Guzman, Global
Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 303 (2004); Laurence R. Helfer,
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of theorists remain skeptical that civil society should play a
significant role in the governance of international institutions. 3
This article argues that involving civil society in the governance of
international institutions is increasingly necessary and that the
traditional approach of consultation is inadequate to catalyze their
potential contribution to these institutions.
Instead, multistakeholder forms of governance, which are features of a number
of twenty-first century institutions, will be increasingly critical to
the success of many international institutions.
Civil society groups are becoming key actors in a wide range of
international arenas that were formerly the exclusive province of
states and increasingly viewed as essential actors in many of these
areas. Few people would suggest today that contemporary global
challenges in areas such as climate change or global health can be
solved by states alone without the extensive participation of nonstate actors. Thus far, relatively few scholars have examined a new
generation of twenty-first century international institutions that are
moving away from exclusively intergovernmental structures and
towards multi-stakeholder partnerships where non-state actors are
full participants in governance. 4 Most work on civil society
Understanding Change in International Organizations: Globalization and Innovation in
the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649 (2006); Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Between
Centralization and Fragmentation: The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of
Democratic Legitimacy 4–6 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Harvard Univ., Working Paper
No. 01-004, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=262175;
Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005); Kal Raustiala, The “Participatory Revolution” in
International Environmental Law, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537 (1997); Ruggie, supra
note 1, at 499.
3 See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Global Governance: The Problematic Legitimacy
Relationship between Global Civil Society and the United Nations (Am. Univ., Wash.
Coll. of Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2008-71, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1265839 (arguing that nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) do not possess sufficient democratic
qualities to play a legitimate role in global governance); John R. Bolton, Should We
Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 205, 217 (2000) (“[I]t is precisely
the detachment from governments that makes international civil society so
troubling, at least for democracies.”); Martin Shapiro, Administrative Law
Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
369 (2001) (arguing that NGOs are epistemic communities that develop rules
through opaque processes that do not involve the participation of voters).
4 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International
Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration
Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 577–78.
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participation within international institutions has primarily
focused on the practice of twentieth century institutions, which
significantly informs the conclusions that many theorists draw
about the role of non-state actors in governance. 5
Innovative twenty-first century institutions, in areas such as
global health, are demonstrating that multi-stakeholder
governance can be extremely successful and increasingly
undermining the logic of those who reject the idea of moving
beyond exclusively inter-governmental arrangements. A rich
literature on associative democracy, which is usually applied to
national contexts, offers fresh insights into some of the key design
challenges facing these multi-stakeholder institutions in terms of
enhancing the contribution of civil society actors. 6
Section 1 examines the theoretical objections raised by scholars
to the inclusion of civil society actors in the governance of
international institutions. It seeks to understand these objections in
the context of the practice of leading international institutions, such
as the United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions. Section
2 highlights a new generation of institutions challenging the
traditional view that states are the only legitimate actors within
international institutions.
Section 3 applies insights from
associative democracy theorists and develops an approach to
evaluating civil society participation that seeks to respond to the
objections posed by critics and offer lessons for the design of
effective international institutions for the twenty-first century.

5 See, e.g., Chadwick Alger, The Emerging Roles of NGOs in the UN System:
From Article 71 to a People’s Millennium Assembly, 8 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 93 (2002)
(examining the developing relationship between the U.N. system and civil society
during the twentieth century); Anderson, supra note 2, at 1311; Charnovitz, supra
note 2, at 352–55 (examining the influence of NGOs on international law with
particular attention to developments in the twentieth century).
6 See, e.g., Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, Secondary Associations and Democratic
Governance, 20 POL. & SOC’Y 393, 464–65 (1992) (suggesting that associative
democracy can enhance democracy while avoiding the dangers of factionalism);
Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Thinking about Empowered Participatory
Governance, in DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED
PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE 3, 5 (Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds., 2003)
(highlighting the reform models that engage ordinary citizens in policymaking
which affects their lives).
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THE MONOPOLY OF STATES APPROACH

Many contemporary scholars of international institutions still
hold the view that states are the only legitimate actors that should
participate in the governance of international institutions. Even as
the scope of involvement of non-state actors continues to expand
within most international institutions, significant debate remains
over the wisdom of civil society participation in the formal
governance of these institutions. A number of scholars challenge
whether civil society should meaningfully participate at all in the
governance of international institutions. 7 Some have even argued
that expanded societal participation reflects a flawed attempt by an
insufficiently representative civil society and incompetent
international institutions to generate legitimacy for each other. 8
Civil society representation in the governance of international
institutions is rejected on the grounds that these groups are not
representative, 9 not sufficiently accountable or legitimate, 10 or that
their very independence from states conflicts with participation in
7 See Anderson, supra note 3, at 25–27 (suggesting that CSOs are just one type
of the many pressure groups involved in the democratic process, and that their
participation does not confer democratic legitimacy per se); Kenneth Anderson &
David Rieff, ‘Global Civil Society’: A Skeptical View, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 2004/5
26, 35–36 (Helmut Anheier et al. eds., 2005) (suggesting that when stakes are high,
particularly during wartime, international organizations turn to the legitimacy
that comes from important state actors, rather than international NGOs); Thomas
M. Franck, Remarks, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS NEW SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 151, 152 (Rainer Hofmann ed., 1998) (“Not only do NGOs not address [the
problem of representativeness] because they are in no sense a substitute for some
direct form of representation of people in the process which normally one thinks
of as parliamentary representation. . . . NGOs are irrelevant . . . .”).
8 See Anderson & Rieff, supra note 7, at 36 (noting that the mutual support
and legitimacy that international organizations and global civil society
organizations provide to each other “appears to have led the NGOs astray”).
9 See Bolton, supra note 3, at 217 (raising the concern of international NGOs’
ability to undermine democratic systems by achieving policy results they could
not otherwise achieve); Anderson, supra note 3, at 12–17 (disputing the idea that
international NGOs are the “legitimate representatives of the world’s people”).
10 See Antonio F. Perez, Who Killed Sovereignty? Or: Changing Norms
Concerning Sovereignty in International Law, 14 WIS. INT’L L.J. 463, 489 (1996)
(suggesting that the community of sovereignty and community of knowledgebase experts lack democratic legitimacy because they do not involve a “political
process . . . built around a politics of interest of groups, not reified states, and
managed by politicians, not technocratic experts”); Shapiro, supra note 3, at 376
(noting the opaque processes used by international NGOs, and suggesting that
international procedures may create accountability and transparency).
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international institutions. 11 These arguments fit broadly within
what I refer to as the “monopoly of states” approach, which holds
that states alone should govern international institutions and
rejects the idea that civil society and non-state actors should
significantly participate in the governance of these institutions.
The most consistent and, in some ways, most powerful
argument against civil society representation in the governance of
international institutions is that non-state actors are not
representative in the traditional sense because they are usually not
elected. 12 The most basic version of this is sometimes posed with
the question: “[W]ho elected the NGOs?” 13 In the first instance, it
is clear that most NGO leaders are not elected and even those who
are elected can usually claim to formally represent only a relatively
small slice of a given population. 14 A more subtle version of the
question of representation has been framed as “[h]ow
representative must an organization be in order to deserve a seat in
governing bodies?” 15 These concerns about the representative
nature of civil society should be examined against the backdrop of
the representational role of other actors within international
institutions.
In the case of many countries, the representation by
governments within international institutions does not adequately
or effectively reflect the views of its citizens. 16 Some states are
11 See Marina Ottaway, Corporatism Goes Global: International Organizations,
Nongovernmental Organization Networks, and Transnational Business, 7 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 265, 267 (2001) (arguing that the cost of corporatist arrangements
between international organizations and international NGOs outweigh their
benefits).
12 See Raustiala, supra note 2, at 567 (“[M]any powerful NGOs come from a
small minority of advanced industrial states, and NGO views are often far from
reflective of the public at large.”).
13 See Anderson, supra note 3, at 28–29 (citing David Rieff and questioning the
representativeness of international NGOs).
14 See id. at 27 (describing NGOs as organizations that provide a voice for
civil society in undemocratic states, but noting that they are not an effective
substitute for democratic elections).
15 See Michael Edwards, Introduction to GLOBAL CITIZEN ACTION 1, 6–8
(Michael Edwards & John Gaventa eds., 2001) (posing the question of how
legitimate a NGO must be to gain a vote in a global organization, and suggesting
that these less heard from voices “add[] an essential layer of checks and balances
into the international system”).
16 See Paul Wapner, Defending Accountability in NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197,
198 (2002) (“There are plenty of nondemocratic polities ruled by those who are
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represented in international institutions by authoritarian
governments which are unlikely to adequately reflect the views of
the citizens of that country, given the lack of effective democratic
processes. The military rulers of Burma, for example, hold a seat
on the General Assembly of the United Nations but seem to have
little claim to represent the people of Burma in any democratic
sense.
At the same time, other states have virtually no representation
within the governance of key international institutions. In the case
of many international institutions, those living in the poorest
countries often have relatively little representation through their
governments in the formal decision-making processes of these
institutions. On the U.N. Security Council, there are no permanent
members from the countries in the Southern Hemisphere. In the
International Monetary Fund, the entire continent of Africa holds
less than 5% of the votes within the institution and the country of
Eritrea holds just 0.02% of the total IMF votes. 17 If many countries
are not represented at all, or significantly, within international
institutions it complicates the idea that states alone can effectively
represent diverse populations in the context of governance.
In both of these circumstances, when a state has little or no
representation or when a state is represented by leaders who were
not selected by its people, there is a reasonable basis to assume that
non-state actors might be able to make a contribution by raising
concerns and offering views that would not otherwise be heard in
Sometimes these groups
forums limited to states alone. 18
accentuate the voice of the often-underrepresented Southern
Hemisphere, while in other cases, civil society groups might raise
issues of concern to marginalized groups within many countries. 19
immune from constitutional constraints and that worry little about satisfying a
broad-based, collective interest.”).
17 IMF Executive Directors and Voting Power, INT’L MONETARY FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.htm (last updated Nov. 23,
2010).
18 See Kal Raustiala, States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions,
41 INT’L STUD. Q. 719 (1997) (describing the tendency of NGOs to uphold values
and concerns that would not otherwise be protected, and explaining the benefits
that states receive from NGO inclusion, such as the enhanced ability to create and
maintain international regulatory rules).
19 See Richard H. Stanley, President, The Stanley Found., Opening Remarks
to The Thirteenth United Nations Issues Conference, Feb. 19–21, 1999, in THE
STANLEY FOUNDATION, THE UNITED NATIONS AND CIVIL SOCIETY: THE ROLE OF NGOS
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A different critique of civil society participation in governance
is tied to the concern that Northern groups would dominate
Southern groups in these global forums. 20 Indeed, this balance
between North and South is already a challenge within most
international institutions, even when governance is limited
exclusively to state actors. It is not at all clear that excluding civil
society altogether from formal governance helps to solve this
underlying problem, as it very likely leaves those living in the
Southern Hemisphere with less of a voice than they would have in
an imperfect governance structure that includes civil society. New
models of constituency-based participation by both Northern and
Southern NGOs, which will be examined in the next section, offer
one potential response to concerns about the geographic balance of
civil society participation.
Another core critique of civil society involvement with
international institutions is that civil society groups are not
sufficiently accountable. 21 Given that most non-state actors are not
directly accountable through elections, it is reasonable to ask by
what mechanism these groups can be held accountable at all.
Some commentators suggest that there should be more universal
standards for the transparency and integrity of non-governmental
organizations. 22 Others suggest that the accountability of NGOs
“should depend upon the particular governance function they
7, 9, available at http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/archive
/Issues99.pdf (noting that, while some NGOs represent the values and concerns
of their members, there are other NGOs that address the concerns of an
“externally defined geographic or community constituency”).
20 See Karin Bäckstrand, Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships for Sustainable
Development: Rethinking Legitimacy, Accountability and Effectiveness, 16 EUR. ENV’T
290, 299 (2006) (concluding that most transnational partnerships are North driven,
composed primarily of international organizations and industrialized states);
Klaus Dingwerth, Private Transnational Governance and the Developing World: A
Comparative Perspective, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 607, 625 (2008) (noting the lower
representation of Southern stakeholders in international governing bodies).
21 See Yanyu Ke, The Democratic Deficit, Intergovernmental Organizations,
and Global Civil Society 15 (Feb. 15, 2009) (unpublished paper), available at
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/3/3/7/
pages313370/p313370-1.php (“Many NGOs lack necessary expertise and
negotiating skills . . . in improving accountability and public participation in
IGOs.”).
22 See id. at 13–17 (suggesting that increased transparency and homogeneity
amongst NGOs could more effectively promote democracy in IGOs, as well as
increase their own democratic accountability).
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perform.” 23 Still others argue that a better approach is to
encourage NGOs to be accountable to their own constituencies, a
goal that can itself be encouraged through the very process of
becoming repeat players in the governance of international
institutions. 24 Since NGOs are particularly vulnerable to threats to
their reputations—and because they are otherwise fairly weak
actors who rely on their credibility for influence—reputational
concerns can be a powerful accountability mechanism. 25
The incentives for civil society actors involved in sustained
interactions on substantive matters within international
institutions are quite different from the incentives for those
without access to the deliberations of these institutions. The
experience of being repeat players with a meaningful voice in these
institutions—in addition to the importance of protecting their
reputation for credibility outside of such institutions—also serves
as a basis for accountability, even without direct elections, for
many civil society groups. 26
Accountability is already perceived as a weakness of many
international institutions in part because of the perceived lack of
23 Erik B. Bluemel, Overcoming NGO Accountability Concerns in International
Governance, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 139, 143 (2005).
24 See Steve Charnovitz, Accountability of Non-Governmental Organizations in
Global Governance, in NGO ACCOUNTABILITY: POLITICS, PRINCIPLES AND INNOVATIONS
21, 27–28 (Lisa Jordan & Peter van Tuijl eds., 2006) (highlighting Peter Spiro’s
argument that the inclusion of NGOs in international decision-making would
make them accountable as repeat players on the international stage).
25 See Robert O. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, in
TAMING GLOBALIZATION: FRONTIERS OF GOVERNANCE 130, 153 (David Held &
Mathias Koenig-Archibugi eds., 2003); Wapner, supra note 16, at 203–04 (noting
that reputational and credibility-based concerns can serve as both an
accountability mechanism and as a powerful incentive for NGOs to self-police).
26 See Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown, Introduction to THE STRUGGLE FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOS, AND GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS 1, 21
(Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1998) (explaining that while NGOs are
not subject to normal institutional accountability mechanisms, they are made
accountable by virtue of their representational concerns and their need to interact
on a continuing basis with other international actors); Wapner, supra note 16, at
203–04 (arguing that civil society actors must maintain their reputation for
credibility and be accountable to state actors if they are to work successfully
within international forums); Vivien Collingwood & Louis Logister, Perceptions of
the Legitimacy of International NGOs, in NGO INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE AND POLICY 21, 30 (Anton Vedder, ed. 2007) (“Certain NGOs draw
legitimacy from their refusal to take money from, or bargain with, political or
corporate bodies.”).
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transparency. Many of these institutions face growing challenges
to their legitimacy as democratic norms become more strongly
embedded internationally. 27 According to Robert Keohane and
Joseph Nye, the older, “club” model of global governance faces
increasing challenges because of its lack of transparency to
outsiders and participation is generally limited to officials from a
relatively small group of countries. 28 Transparency is generally
enhanced by the participation of civil society within international
organizations. In fact, NGO participation was found to be a
leading predictor of organizational transparency in a recent study
of 72 international organizations. 29
Recent work on the legitimacy of international institutions has
highlighted the importance of “input legitimacy,” as well as
Rules
“output legitimacy,” or successful problem-solving. 30
promoting transparency and public participation in international
institutions can be extremely important to promoting procedural

27 See Claudia Kissling & Jens Steffek, CSOs and Democratization of
International Governance: Prospects and Problems, in CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN
EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: A CURE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT? 208,
216 (Jens Steffek et al. eds., 2008) (“We can conclude from the evidence presented
in this book that the participatory practices in international organizations need to
be improved if the existing potentials for democratizing international decisionmaking are to be realized.”).
28 See Keohane & Nye, supra note 2, at 4–6 (explaining that while exclusivity
of membership and a lack of transparency were once essential to the success of the
“club” model of global governance, these factors have brought this model under
scrutiny in today’s interconnected, globalized world).
29 See generally Alexandru Grigorescu, Transparency of Intergovernmental
Organizations: The Roles of Member States, International Bureaucracies and
Nongovernmental Organizations, 51 INT’L STUD. Q. 625 (2007). Even skeptics of
traditional approaches to transparency recognize the contribution of multistakeholder models. See, e.g., Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA
L. REV. 885, 948 (2006) (recognizing that deliberation involving community groups
and government officials leads to greater transparency).
30 See Bäckstrand, supra note 20, at 294–96 (defining “input legitimacy” as
balanced representation of various stakeholders, and accountability and
transparency mechanisms to monitor the effectiveness of partnerships and
“output legitimacy” the effectiveness of partnership networks); see also Klaus Dieter
Wolf, Private Actors and the Legitimacy of Governance Beyond the State: Conceptional Outlines
and Empirical Explorations 12–20 (Apr. 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Technical University of Darnstadt, Institute for Political Science), available at
http://www.politikwissenschaft.tu-darmstadt.de/fileadmin/pg/media/papers
/civil.pdf (using input and output legitimacy as methods of critically assessing
the overall legitimacy and effectiveness of governing bodies).
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legitimacy. 31 Keohane and Nye ultimately concluded that “any
sustainable pattern of governance will have to institutionalize
channels of contact between international organizations and
constituencies within civil society.” 32 Therefore, the broader
challenge is not just to ensure the accountability of civil society
groups, but also to harness their potential contribution to the
overall accountability of the international institutions in which
they participate.
Another critique of civil society involvement in the governance
of international institutions is the idea that their participation in
governance undermines and weakens the influence of states. 33 The
argument is that civil society participation will undercut the more
directly representative role served by many state actors. Some
observers have claimed that incorporating civil society increases
the autonomy and independence of these institutions from key
state actors. 34 Others have suggested that incorporating NGOs in

31 See Bodansky, supra note 2, at 614 (noting the importance of transparency and
participation in legitimizing democratic forms of government); Thomas Risse,
Transnational Governance and Legitimacy 10 (Feb. 17, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with the Freie Universität Berlin Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science Center
for Transatlantic Foreign and Security Policy), available at http://userpage.fuberlin.de/~atasp/texte/tn_governance_benz.pdf (“[I]ncluding non-state actors in
global governance is also meant to increase the external accountability of states.
Trisectoral public policy networks and global public private partnerships are
precisely meant to close the participatory gap identified by critics of international
regimes.”).
32 Keohane & Nye, supra note 2, at 25.
33 See Bolton, supra note 3, at 217 (suggesting that civil society involvement in
the international context may decrease state power and even undermine
democracy by giving intrastate advocates a second opportunity to pose
arguments that were previously rejected); Duncan B. Hollis, Private Actors in
Public International Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for the Retention of State
Sovereignty, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 235, 237 (2002) (noting the argument that
allowing private actors participate in public international law may erode state
sovereignty). See generally Shapiro, supra note 3 (exploring the role played by
NGOs in administrative decision-making, and suggesting that the distinction
between governmental and non-governmental actors has been blurred due to
increased civil society participation).
34 See Gabriel Casaburi et al., Multilateral Development Banks, Governments, and
Civil Society: Chiaroscuros in a Triangular Relationship, 6 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 493,
502–05 (2000) (suggesting that increased civil society participation has placed a
check on the power of governments and has given institutions a greater role in
decision-making).
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these institutions challenges the fundamental concept of
sovereignty itself. 35
On its face, the participation of non-state actors in the
governance of international institutions would seem to dilute the
monopoly of state actors over shaping the direction of these
institutions. Yet, it is not always the case that including civil
society actually weakens the role of states in shaping the key
outcomes of international institutions.
Given the relative
representation of states and non-state actors within most
governance structures, it is virtually impossible that the views of
non-state actors could ever prevail without substantial support
from at least some states. 36
Therefore, while civil society participation could plausibly
affect the role of some states in shaping key international
institutions, it is not the case that non-state actors could
significantly shape these institutions without the support of some
states. Perhaps the more reasonable concern is that non-state
actors would buttress the efforts of a given international institution
to enhance their own autonomy and authority. 37 Yet, civil society
participation is closely tied to stronger rules in these institutions,
requiring expanded transparency, and often, accountability. 38
35 See Jeffrey Andrew Hartwick, Non-Governmental Organizations at United
Nations-Sponsored World Conferences: A Framework for Participation Reform, 26 LOY.
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 217, 249–50 (2003) (discussing the argument that NGOs,
as unelected, extra-national entities, may threaten national sovereignty by making
“decisions that are not necessarily in the best interest of a nation-state”); Raustiala,
supra note 18, at 720 (recognizing the argument that civil society participation in
international institutions may challenge state sovereignty, but ultimately arguing
that NGO inclusion works to the advantage of states); Raustiala, supra note 2, at
585 (discussing the argument that the rise of transnational private actors has
caused a corresponding decline in state power in the international arena).
36 See Thomas Risse-Kappen, Structures of Governance and Transnational
Relations: What Have We Learned?, in BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN:
NON-STATE ACTORS, DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 280,
294 (Thomas Risse-Kappen ed., 1995) (noting that transnational actors must
depend upon and work with state actors in order to be effective, rather than
diminish state control over international systems).
37 See generally MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE
WORLD: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS (2004) (offering an
overview of international organizations and their effect on global politics, and the
ways in which increased autonomy allow such organizations to evolve,
occasionally in unintended ways).
38 See Volker Rittberger, Global Governance: From ‘Exclusive’ Executive
Multilateralism to Inclusive, Multipartite Institutions 14 (Eberhard Karls Univ. of
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Consequently, the proposition that enhanced participation leads to
greater institutional autonomy is not self-evident. Indeed, wider
transparency almost always exposes these institutions to greater
outside scrutiny.
Even when non-state actors are able to overcome the views of
some states within these institutions, it is not immediately obvious
that civil society representation undermines the capacity of states
to influence the international arena. In fact, some scholars argue
that including NGO participation actually strengthens the ability of
states to regulate and shape important arenas. 39 Thus, even if civil
society involvement in governance could challenge the monopoly
of state influence on a given decision, it might actually enhance the
capacity of such states, and thereby indirectly serve their interests.
While some fear that non-state actors might undermine the
influence of states, others fear that including these actors in formal
governance jeopardizes the independence of civil society groups,
thereby undercutting their core comparative advantage. 40 Such
participation in governance is sometimes viewed as inevitably
leading to a process of co-optation at the international level,
through which states shape the views and behavior of non-state
actors. 41 One of the central roles played by civil society groups in
relation to international institutions is often that of an independent,
external watchdog, monitoring the operations of the institution. 42
Tübingen Inst. for Political Sci., Working Paper No. 52, 2008), available at
http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/uni/spi/taps/tap52.pdf (“The inclusion of actors
from civil society and the business sector also positively impacts on the
effectiveness of an institution because it leads to an increased readiness to comply
with norms and rules.”).
39 See Charnovitz, supra note 2, at 362–63 (noting that NGO involvement in
international law may “strengthen states when the new international legislation
promoted by NGOs expands states’ regulatory agendas”); Raustiala, supra note 2,
at 538 (arguing that NGO participation in international environmental law yields
many potential benefits for states including political, technical, and informational
benefits).
40 See Ottaway, supra note 11, at 266–67 (arguing that incorporating civil
society groups in international governance may weaken their ability to contribute
innovative ideas).
41 See id. at 267.
42 See Raustiala, supra note 2, at 560–61 (noting the instrumental role that
NGOs have played in monitoring state compliance with international
environmental law); Jan Aart Scholte, Civil Society and Democratically Accountable
Global Governance, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 211, 217–19 (2004) (discussing the
benefits that civil society organization monitoring has brought to democratic
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As NGOs gain greater influence through formal structures of
institutions—as in the United Nations—they are increasingly
subject to the rules and cultures of those institutions’
bureaucracies. 43 Multi-stakeholder approaches to governance, at
their worst, can serve as agents “of co-optation rather than
representation.” 44 Yet, this challenge fundamentally reflects the
imbalances that can exist within governance structures, and
suggests the importance of institutional designs that ensure
effective participation without imposing bureaucratic constraints.
Unless one assumes that any engagement with formal
institutions inevitably compromises the independence of civil
society groups, it remains plausible that expanded access to
information and internal deliberations of formal institutions could
strengthen rather than weaken the watchdog function of civil
society. Within many institutions, civil society groups continue to
play both inside and outside roles and sometimes utilize the
enhanced transparency of the institution as a point of leverage for
broader reform. 45 Nonetheless, it is instructive to highlight the
possibility that civil society will simply become the tool of
powerful states when contemplating a design of international
institutions that might reduce such risks of co-optation. 46
While critics of civil society participation sometimes fear that
these non-state actors might challenge the interests of states, their
greatest contribution to governance may well be to introduce the
perspectives of diverse societal actors precisely because they hold
views different than those advanced by powerful states. These
views will sometimes reflect the long-term interest of states
otherwise constrained by short-term political factors, and at other

accountability, including increased review of state compliance with constitutions,
official resolutions, and public declarations).
43 See Ottaway, supra note 11, at 277 (arguing that increased NGO
participation within the United Nations has left these organizations shackled by
bureaucratic rules and divided them into separate categories).
44 Id. at 267.
45 See Scholte, supra note 42, at 219 (“Once policy practices are publicly
visible, civil society associations are in a position to advance democratic
accountability in global governance through watchdog and evaluation
activities.”).
46 See Ottaway, supra note 11, at 267–70 (noting the tendency of global
corporatism to weaken the contributions of civil society groups, and to subsume
the agendas of NGOs within the larger agendas of state-actors).
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times might foster a broader global consensus of stakeholders
around a common mission that otherwise could not be achieved.
2.1. Theory Grounded in Twentieth Century Practice
The views expressed by many of the theorists who remain
skeptical of significant civil society participation in international
institutions reflect the prevailing practice of leading twentieth
century international institutions.
The core international
institutions founded shortly after World War II remain
fundamentally inter-governmental bodies. The way in which
many scholars in the field conceived of these institutions often
centered on their role in fostering inter-governmental cooperation.
Despite reforms at the end of the last century designed to facilitate
consultation with civil society, these institutions remained forums
for cooperation among states. 47 As a result, the world of twentieth
century practice, which shaped so much of the literature in the
field, remained quite limited in terms of the roles that it imagined
civil society could play within international institutions.
One of the ironies of the rejection of civil society participation
in the governance of key international institutions is the important
role that many of these groups played in the founding of the
United Nations and other institutions in the first place. In 1945,
representatives from as many as forty-two NGOs were invited to
serve as advisers to the official U.S. delegation at the founding
conference of the United Nations. 48 In total, 1,200 voluntary
associations were present at the founding of the United Nations. 49
Yet, the extensive involvement of civil society organizations in the
founding conference of the United Nations after World War II did
not lead to non-state actors being given a meaningful role within
the U.N. structure.
The United Nations Charter initially had no provision even for
any formal consultation with civil society groups. Article 71 was
47 See Peter Willetts, From “Consultative Arrangements” to “Partnership”: The
Changing Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at the UN, 6 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 191, 191–
92 (2000) (describing the evolution of consultative arrangements between NGOs
and the United Nations); see also Casaburi et al., supra note 34, at 496–505
(discussing the increased participation of multilateral development banks in
global governance).
48 AKIRA
IRIYE, GLOBAL COMMUNITY: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 43 (2002).
49 Alger, supra note 5, at 93.
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only incorporated into the Charter after aggressive lobbying by the
World Federation of Trade Unions. It provided that: “The
Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for
consultation with non-governmental organizations which are
concerned with matters within its competence.” 50 The Economic
and Social Council (“ECOSOC”) defined NGOs as “[a]ny
international organization which is not established by
intergovernmental agreement,” and only admitted national NGOs
to consultative status with the permission of their home
government. 51
Although ECOSOC became the primary locus for consultations
with NGOs within the United Nations, it is one of the weakest of
the core U.N. organs, with much less influence than the Security
Council or the General Assembly. Yet, even within ECOSOC, civil
society groups were not viewed as full observers: “A clear
distinction is drawn in the Charter of the United Nations between
participation without vote in the deliberations of the Council and
Unlike NGOs, those
the arrangements for consultation.” 52
members of international organizations and governments who
served as observers were permitted to participate in deliberations
as part of decision-making. 53 In contrast, non-state actors might
have been consulted, but did not have a role in the deliberations of
the United Nations. 54
As with the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions
opted for a governance model that was limited only to states. The
governance structures of both the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund consisted exclusively of states with
voting shares weighted based on a quota system that was meant to

U.N. Charter art. 71.
E.S.C. Res. 288B(X) of February 27, 1950 was adopted with amendments by
E.S.C. Res. 1296(XIV), ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1968/1296 (May 23, 1968).
52 E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1996/31 (July 25, 1996); see also
Alger, supra note 5, at 95–96 (discussing the poor design of consultative status
rules for NGOs working with ECOSOC and the resistance of some UN member
states to increased NGO participation).
53 See Willetts, supra note 47, at 191–92 (noting that nonmember states or
intergovernmental organizations could, as “observers,” participate in the
decision-making process, but NGOs are not allowed that level of participation).
54 See id. (describing the limited roles NGOs were allowed within the United
Nations).
50
51
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reflect each country’s share of the global economy. 55 Neither
institution seriously contemplated a significant role for non-state
actors in the governance structure, nor did they initially establish a
structure for consultation with civil society.
In the last decade of the twentieth century, the expansion of
consultative processes within leading international institutions
demonstrated the possibility and limits of reform within an older
generation of institutions. Challenges to the effectiveness and the
legitimacy of many of these institutions catalyzed reform at the
same time that non-state actors were expanding their involvement
in many international arenas. These institutions responded by
moving in the direction of greater openness to consultation with
external stakeholders.
Unlike the United Nations, the World Bank did not have a
formal role for NGOs in its early years. Before 1981, there was no
formal mechanism for the World Bank to consult with NGOs. In
1981, the Bank developed Operational Policy Note (10.05), which
outlined potential benefits from more direct engagement with civil
society groups, and suggested the possible involvement of NGOs
in project identification, design, financing, implementation, and
evaluation of projects. 56 In 1989, the Bank adopted another
operational directive (14.70) that outlined procedures for
consulting with NGOs on specific bank projects at different stages
of development. 57
Although the World Bank formed a Bank-NGO committee in
1981 to engage with fifteen NGO leaders, only in the 1990s did the
Bank take a much more active role in soliciting broader civil
society feedback on its work. 58 The shift was catalyzed largely by
the findings of the independent Morse Commission. In the wake
55 NGAIRE WOODS, THE GLOBALIZERS: THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK, AND THEIR
BORROWERS 22–23 (2006).
56 See Ibrahim F.I.
Shihata, The World Bank and Non-Governmental
Organizations, 25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 623, 625 (1992) (discussing the evolution of the
World Bank’s policy of participation with NGOs and the benefits of Operational
Policy Note (10.05)).
57 Id. at 626.
58 See generally Jane G. Covey, Is Critical Cooperation Possible? Influencing the
World Bank Through Operational Collaboration and Policy Dialogue, in THE STRUGGLE
FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOS, AND GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS 81
(Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1998) (discussing World Bank-NGO
project collaborations and the increased involvement of NGOs in Bank projects).
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of the Commission’s findings, Washington-based NGOs testified
before Congress that they would “oppose funds to the Bank
unless” it created an independent body to respond to complaints
by citizens and civil society groups in countries where Bank
projects operated. 59 As a result of the Commission, there was
growing interest on the part of the U.S. Congress and international
NGOs in developing new mechanisms of consultation and
accountability, such as the creation of an independent Inspection
Panel. 60 In 1993, the U.S. Congress linked its contribution to the
replenishment of the Bank’s International Development
Association funds to the creation of an independent Inspection
Panel, and the Bank created the Panel that same year. 61
Amidst these growing pressures for accountability to local
stakeholders, the World Bank also endorsed an innovative Report
of the Participatory Development Learning Group in 1994. One of
the key findings of the Learning Group was that: “There is
significant evidence that participation can in many circumstances
improve the quality, effectiveness, and sustainability of projects,
and strengthen ownership and commitment of government and
stakeholders.” 62 The report proved to be a precursor to the
subsequent expansion of the Bank’s consultative processes with
NGOs. In 1995, the Bank-NGO Committee created six regional
bodies and in 1997, the Bank created civil society liaison staff at all
of its seventy-two resident missions around the world. 63
Despite these steps toward greater openness to civil society
consultation, it remained extremely rare for any high-level policy
59 Lori Udall, The World Bank and Public Accountability: Has Anything
Changed?, in THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOS, AND
GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS 391, 402 (Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1998).
60 See Fox & Brown, supra note 26, at 8 (explaining how the findings of the
Morse Commission inspired Congress and international NGOs to push for
broader policy changes at the World Bank, including the establishment of an
Inspection Panel that could accept complaints from project-affected people).
61 See WOODS, supra note 55, at 28 (explaining how the U.S. Congress used the
threat of withholding funds to pressure the World Bank into creating the
Inspection Panel).
62 THE WORLD BANK, ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING ENGAGEMENT
BETWEEN THE WORLD BANK AND CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS 6 (2005) (quoting the
1994 final report of the World Bank’s Participatory Development Learning
Group).
63 See WOODS, supra note 55, at 170 (discussing the influence of NGOs in
shaping the World Bank debt strategy).
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decisions by the World Bank board to reflect substantial
consultation with NGOs, and there was still no role for civil society
in formal governance. 64 Civil society input remains discretionary,
and the central debate over governance reform within the World
Bank continues to be focused on the shares of votes between
different state actors. As one scholar explained, consultation does
not necessarily imply actual participation in governance it is“seen
as a proxy for participation” and thus “restricted to consultation by
request.” 65
Just as the World Bank faced growing pressures to expand its
consultations with non-state actors, so too did the United Nations,
as the role of NGOs grew in the context of environmental and
other major U.N. conferences. ECOSOC remained the central body
with which non-state actors could engage, if not fully participate. 66
By the 1970s, NGOs were allowed to participate formally in Special
Sessions on development and other issues. 67 Although NGOs
initially had fewer rights to participate in conferences than in
ECOSOC, by the 1980s, these groups achieved an expanded role in
Still, there remained substantial
international conferences. 68
restrictions on the role that civil society groups were allowed to
play in these settings. 69
64 See THE WORLD BANK, CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT: REVIEW OF FISCAL YEARS
2005 AND 2006, 67 (2006) (observing that while there is growing operational
collaboration between the World Bank and NGOs, the Bank still needs to make
changes to engage with civil society groups more effectively).
65 Casaburi et al., supra note 34, at 503; see also Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The
Impact of Civil Society on the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the
World Trade Organization: The Case of the World Bank, 7 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 399,
406 (2001) (noting that consultation fails to provide NGOs with any concrete
influence over decisions made by the World Bank).
66 See generally Alger, supra note 5, at 95 (discussing the varying roles and
duties given to NGOs according to their consultative status within the ECOSOC).
67 See Peter Willetts, The Rules of the Game: The United Nations and Civil Society,
in WHOSE WORLD IS IT ANYWAY?: CIVIL SOCIETY, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
MULTILATERAL FUTURE 247, 273 (John W. Foster & Anita Anand eds., 1999)
(discussing the participation of NGOs in Special Sessions beginning in the 1970s).
68 See Willetts, supra note 47, at 193 (noting that by the mid-1980s, NGOs
“increasingly had a higher political status and better participation opportunities”
at international conferences than in ECOSOC).
69 See Ronnie D. Lipschutz & Cathleen Fogel, “Regulation for the Rest of Us?”
Global Civil Society and the Privatization of Transnational Regulation, in THE
EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 115, 116 (Rodney Bruce
Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002) (noting that while non-state social actors
were allowed “access to and influence within a number of intergovernmental
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A more ambitious shift toward multi-stakeholder governance
was contemplated by high-level advisors to the U.N. but was never
realized in practice. This vision was articulated by the High-Level
Panel on U.N. Civil Society Relations led by former Brazilian
President Cardoso in its 1994 report “We the Peoples: Civil
Society, the United Nations, and Global Governance.” 70 The report
called for the managed inclusion of civil society groups in the
processes of the General Assembly and also for expanded
engagement with the Security Council. 71 In order to implement
these recommendations an ECOSOC resolution called on the
General Assembly to establish mechanisms for participation by
NGOs in “all areas of the work of the United Nations.” 72 Yet, there
was substantial resistance by a number of Security Council
members, especially to the idea of allowing the General Assembly
to consider expanding NGO participation in other organs of the
United Nations. 73 As a result, a subgroup of the General Assembly
Working Group on Reform of the U.N. system, which was
established to take up the question of NGO access to U.N.
proceedings, was unable to reach any agreement on the group’s
mandate or meaningfully move the agenda forward. 74

institutions such as [ECOSOC], for the most part there were serious restrictions in
terms of what they could say or do in these forums”).
70 U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations and
Global Governance: Rep. of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil
Society Relations, U.N. Doc. A/58/817, at 70 (June 7, 2004) (“Through assertive use
of the moral leadership and convening power of the Secretary-General, the
Organization could champion a new vision of global governance throughout the
international system . . . .”).
71 Id. at 16–18 (detailing proposals that would increase civil society input to
the General Assembly and the Security Council).
72 Willetts, supra note 47, at 198 (analyzing the debate over the level of
involvement NGOs were given in the United Nations, and explaining that the
original agreement on NGO involvement did not apply to the General Assembly,
but ECOSOC recommended that it be discussed later).
73 See Barbara Adams, ECOSOC and NGOs: A Review of the Review, 1 CIVIL
SOCIETY ENGAGING MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS: AT THE CROSSROADS 8, 11 (1999),
available
at
http://www.fimcivilsociety.org/en/library/FIMForum1999.pdf
(noting that the United States and European Union were against NGO
involvement in every facet of the United Nations).
74 See Stanley, supra note 19, at 7 (recounting the history of NGOs’ attempts to
play a role in global governance and decision-making).
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Today, NGOs are still not in a position to formally deliberate
alongside United Nations Member States in policy-setting arenas. 75
The backlash to expanded civil society participation reflected the
fears on the part of some U.N. delegates of losing a nation-state
monopoly on decision-making. By 1998, there was a movement to
further curtail NGO access to U.N. processes. 76 In no case did
NGOs become full participants in core structures of the U.N.
system in the sense of having a vote and the ability to formally
negotiate with state actors within these still primarily
intergovernmental forums. 77 Despite recent shifts toward greater
consultation with civil society at the United Nations and the World
Bank, each of these institutions remained bodies in which states
deliberate and decide without meaningful participation by nonstate actors.
3.

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY INSTITUTIONS

The emergence of twenty-first century institutions that are
adopting multi-stakeholder models of governance and expanding
the role of civil society creates an opening for new ways of
thinking about the governance of international institutions. This
Section highlights these new institutions, their approach to multistakeholder governance, and the challenge it poses to inherited
assumptions about the proper roles of states and non-state actors
in the international arena. While many scholars still reject the
wisdom of civil society participation in governance, the experience
of these new institutions points toward the potential for a new
approach that encompasses the emerging twenty-first century role
of societal actors as partners with states in responding to pressing
global challenges. Civil society groups are among a range of nonstate actors that are now centrally involved in the formal
governance of diverse institutions and are transforming the nature
of the debate around many key global challenges. In many cases,
these new institutions have involved civil society in the formal

75 See id. at 18 (stressing the importance of fostering a clear understanding of
the relationship between NGOs and the United Nations to create a sustainable
partnership).
76 See ANN FLORINI, THE COMING DEMOCRACY: NEW RULES FOR RUNNING A NEW
WORLD 202 (2005).
77 See id. at 206–07.
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governance structure of the institution in ways that go beyond the
consultation model of the United Nations and the World Bank.
There has been relatively little scholarly work on many of these
new institutions established in the last decade in sectors such as
global health, education, and agricultural development, which
have introduced new approaches to governance. 78 Much of the
valuable literature highlighting multi-stakeholder models of
governance within international institutions has focused on the
historical legacy of twentieth century institutions such as the
International Labor Organization (“ILO”), which includes nonstate actors selected by states in its governance structure. 79 There is
relatively little existing research in this area looking across
institutions and sectors. 80
At the same time, there is an important literature on global
administrative law, which focuses on the role of procedural
requirements within international institutions as a means to

78 See generally Kenneth W. Abbott, Innovations in Global Health and the Global
Governance System, WALL SUMMER INST. (2007) (analyzing changes in health
systems through the lens of public and private global governance systems,
including the roles of NGOs); Sonja Bartsch, The Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria, in GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE AND THE FIGHT AGAINST
HIV/AIDS 146 (Wolfgang Hein et al. eds., 2007) (examining key actors in global
health, and analyzing the patterns of conflict and cooperation in the fight against
HIV/AIDS and global health governance); KENT BUSE, OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT
INST., EDUCATION FOR ALL—FAST TRACK INITIATIVE: REVIEW OF THE GOVERNANCE
AND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES (2005), available at http://www.hlfhealthmdgs.org
/HLF4Tunis/Education%20for%20All%20FTI%20materials/EFAFTIGovernanceE
valuation.pdf (reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of the governance
structures used by the Fast Track Initiative, an organization whose goal is to bring
about universal primary school completion).
79 See Steve Charnovitz, The Emergence of Democratic Participation in Global
Governance (Paris 1919), 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 45, 64 (2003) (describing the
role of non-state actors in the International Labour Organization). See generally
Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations:
Globalization and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649 (2006) (explaining the
ILO’s preeminent profile in the debate of global governance, and the efficacy of its
governance structure); Faina Milman-Sivan, Representativity, Civil Society, and the
EU Social Dialogue: Lessons from the International Labor Organization, 16 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 311 (2009) (discussing representation in EU social dialogue
and the lessons that can be learned from ILO).
80 See generally Magdalena Bexell et al., Democracy in Global Governance: The
Promises and Pitfalls of Transnational Actors, 16 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 81 (2010)
(examining the organizational structures of international organizations and
identifying a need for research that explores expanded participation in global
governance).
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improving responsiveness and accountability of these
institutions. 81 Although this literature clearly recognizes the
emerging role of hybrid institutions involving non-state actors, it
focuses on enhancing the accountability of international
institutions through procedures adopted from the context of
administrative law. 82 It particularly highlights the requirements of
expanded transparency, participation through notice and
comment, and the requirement of reason-giving in the context of
decision-making. 83 The administrative law vision appears largely
compatible with expanded consultation with NGOs within
international institutions without necessarily requiring full civil
society
participation
in
multi-stakeholder
governance.
Nonetheless, many of its insights regarding the importance of
transparency and access to information, among other procedural
standards, remain extremely valuable to thinking about the design
of multi-stakeholder institutions.
Early in the twenty-first century, a range of new institutions
adopted multi-stakeholder forms of governance that involved civil
society actors as full participants. A number of these institutions
focused on global health financing, despite the fact that finance has
been viewed as a “least likely” case for civil society participation. 84
Launched in 2000, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and
Immunization (“GAVI”), initiated a new era for the multiWhen GAVI was
stakeholder approach to governance. 85
established it was somewhat unique in the significant role that it
81 See generally Benedict Kingsbury & Lorenzo Casini, Global Administrative
Law Dimensions of International Organizations Law (Inst. for Int’l L. and Just.,
Working Paper No. 2009/9, 2009) (arguing that the use of global administrative
law mechanisms strengthens the law of international organizations).
82 See Kingsbury et al., supra note 2, at 38–40 (explaining that global
administrative law techniques allow for transparency in international
organizations so that other nations can express their opinions).
83 See
Benedict Kingsbury et al., Foreword: Global Governance as
Administration—National and Transnational Approaches to Global Administrative Law,
68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 8 (2005) (noting the effect of global administrative
law to affect accountability through open procedural mechanisms, which allow
broader public participation).
84 See Kal Raustiala, States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions,
41 INT’L STUD. Q. 719, 734 (1997).
85 See generally GAVI Alliance, Innovative Partnership, http://www
.gavialliance.org/about/in_partnership/index.php (last visited Nov. 12, 2010)
(summarizing the objectives of the Alliance’s multi-stakeholder partnership and
the unique contributions of the individual members).
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provided to non-state actors such as partner foundations, the
private sector, and technical experts. 86 The GAVI Alliance Board
sets overall policies and monitors programs. The Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation holds one of four “renewable” seats on the GAVI
Alliance Board. In addition, there are several other seats for nonstate actors among the twelve rotating seats on the board. Of
these, one is designated for civil society groups while the others are
allocated to research and technical health institutes, the developing
country vaccine industry, and the industrialized country vaccine
industry. 87
In 2005, the GAVI Alliance Board determined that it needed to
further strengthen the participation of civil society constituencies
in its governance and programs, and allocated expanded resources
to enhance civil society representation at the country level. In 2010,
the GAVI Partners forum created the GAVI Alliance Civil Society
Constituency, a group of civil society representatives, to support
members of GAVI’s governance bodies in their responses related to
governance functions. 88 In addition, GAVI created the position of
a Communications Focal Point for the civil society constituency in
order to support wider participation and improved
communication within the constituency. 89
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria,
launched in 2002, went even further than the GAVI model in terms
of broadening multi-stakeholder participation in its governance
structure. 90 The Global Fund provides for a wider representation
of civil society groups and a greater role in its governance structure

86 Id. (highlighting that the “added ingredient” to GAVI’s objective is to
strengthen the engagement of civil society organizations in order to broaden the
Alliance’s perspective and to ensure that government and international actors are
acting in the best interest of the people they serve).
87 GAVI Alliance, The GAVI Alliance Board, http://www.gavialliance.org
/about/governance/boards/index.php (last visited Nov. 23, 2010) (charting the
different groups affiliated with the Alliance).
88 GAVI Alliance, Civil Society Organisations, http://www.gavialliance.org
/about/in_partnership/cso/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2010) (outlining the Alliance’s
“Call to Action” in strengthening its engagement with civil society organizations).
89 Id.
90 See Bartsch, supra note 78, at 146 (discussing the creation of the Global
Fund, the strengths and weaknesses of its structured partnership, and its impact
on general discourses in global health).
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for developing country governments. 91
In addition to
incorporating civil society representation from the global North
and South, the Global Fund also includes the most directly affected
communities of people living with AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria
on its Board. 92
With each of these civil society representatives, a
communications focal point plays a key role in organizing the
constituency and facilitating the selection process for the board
member, the alternate board member, and the wider delegation for
meetings of the board. The communications focal point serves as
the primary convener of internal deliberations within the
delegation and also as a liaison to other delegations and the
Secretariat in order to ensure a steady flow of information to
members of the delegation. The nominations for the board
member for the affected communities delegation is conducted
through an open call for applicants based on candidates’ capacity
to commit their time and participate in the work of the board. 93
For other delegations, the communications focal point arranges a
nomination and selection process that includes all the members of
the delegation and wider stakeholders actively involved in the
constituency.
Instead of having a single representative from a given
foundation or civil society group, the constituency model of the
Global Fund established a full-fledged delegation designed to
reflect greater diversity within each sector. 94 In addition, the
91 See Kenneth W. Abbott, Toward a Richer Institutionalism for International Law
and Policy, 1 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 9, 23 (2005) (highlighting the Global Fund’s
structured partnership, which includes governments, international organizations,
Northern and Southern NGOs, philanthropic foundations, businesses, and people
living with diseases).
92 See Bartsch, supra note 78, at 152 (noting that the “affected communities”—
CSOs representing people living with the diseases—secured a voting seat on the
Executive Board after demonstrating that such move would ensure that the views
of the people are represented and thereby strengthen the Global Fund’s
reputation).
93 Call for Nominations for Members of the Global Fund Communities Delegation
2011 Through 2013, WORLD CARE COUNCIL (Nov. 6, 2010 4:58AM),
http://www.worldcarecouncil.org/content/call-nominations-gf-communitiesdelegation (last visited Nov. 12, 2010) (calling for nominations for the Global Fund
Communities Delegation, and citing the criteria for which the selection will be
based on).
94 Abbott, supra note 91, at 23 (”The Fund promotes parallel forms of
collaboration in recipient countries.”).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

GARTNER.DOC

620

1/13/2011 7:04 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 32:2

Fund’s governance structure established a donor bloc, including
foundations and the private sector, and a recipient bloc, including
civil society, and recipient countries. Major decisions of the Global
Fund are usually based on consensus. 95 However, in the absence
of consensus, concurring majorities are required such that both the
donor bloc and the recipient bloc must demonstrate two-thirds
support of those present in order to approve a controversial
decision. 96 Civil society also plays a unique leadership role on the
Board since the roles of Chair and Vice-Chair are distributed and
alternate between stakeholders from the donor and recipient
blocs. 97 Civil society representatives have in the recent past served
as the Vice-Chair of the board of the Global Fund. 98
Beyond global health, a number of other important sectors,
such as education and agriculture, have adopted this multistakeholder approach to governance in recent years.
The
Education for All—Fast Track Initiative (“FIT”), like the Global
Fund, emerged out of the leadership of the G8 early in the twentyfirst century. It was established to accelerate progress to achieve
universal primary education by leveraging resources and
coordinating donor efforts in countries with strong national
education plans which lacked adequate resources. 99 Initially
governed by a broad partnership meeting and, subsequently by a
steering group it recently adopted a multi-stakeholder governance
structure for its board that moves it closer to the model of the
Global Fund. In 2010, as part of a broader reform process, the FTI
transformed its governance structure to include an equal number
of developing countries as donors on the Board and extended three
95 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria By-laws, art. 7
(as amended May 1, 2009), available at http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents
/TGF_Bylaws_en.pdf [hereinafter The Global Fund to Fight AIDS] (outlining the
method by which decisions are made within the Fund).
96 Id.
97 Bartsch, supra note 78, at 152–55 (describing the structure of the Global
Fund’s executive board, and noting that civil service organizations are the second
most influential members on the board).
98 See, e.g., HÉLÈNE ROSSERT-BLAVIER, THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS,
TUBERCULOSIS, AND MALARIA, SELF-ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL STATEMENT FROM
THE VICE CHAIR OF THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA 9
(2005), available at http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/Auto-evaluation
_Helene_Rossert-Blavier_en.pdf.
99 Buse, supra note 78, at 2–3 (explaining the goals and aims of the Fast Track
Initiative).
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seats to civil society organizations. 100 The FTI unified control over
its trust funds under the Board, eliminating exclusively donor
governance of its core resources. 101
In the agricultural sector, the recently created Global
Agriculture and Food Security Program (“GAFSP”) also reflects
direct civil society involvement in governance. The steering
committee of the GAFSP includes the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation—along with several governments—as one of five
voting members who were also the original contributors to the
GAFSP trust fund. 102 In addition, the GAFSP steering committee
includes three non-voting civil society representatives who have
the same status as representatives from other multilateral
institutions. The civil society seats are specifically allocated with
two set aside for Southern NGO representation from different
regions, and one seat provided for Northern NGO representation,
from a country that is a member of the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (“OECD”). 103
An emerging twenty-first century model of civil society
participation in the governance of international institutions reflects
a shift away from mere consultation toward full membership for
non-state actors in formal governance structures. Pioneered in the
field of global health, similar models have since been translated
into other sectors, including education and agriculture. What
unites these diverse institutions is their commitment to multistakeholder governance, in contrast to primarily intergovernmental bodies.

100 See EDUCATION FOR ALL—FAST TRACK INITIATIVE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
MEETING, KEY DECISIONS (May 2010), available at http://www.educationfasttrack
.org/media/library/Secure/Board_Documents_May-2010/Final_Board_Key
_Decisions_Bod-May-2010.pdf (adopting changes to the current Board
composition to affect greater equity and inclusion).
101 Id.
102 See GLOBAL AGRIC. & FOOD SEC. PROGRAM, GLOBAL AGRICULTURE AND FOOD
SECURITY PROGRAM (GAFSP) GOVERNANCE DOCUMENT, 2(i) (adopted May 14, 2010),
available
at
http://www.gafspfund.org/gafsp/sites/gafspfund.org/files
/Documents/GovernanceDocument.pdf (listing members of the steering
committee ).
103 See id. at 2(i)(B)(d) (allocating three seats on the steering committee to civil
society organizations).
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3.1. From Governance to Impact
With this new generation of institutions, there is also new data
to suggest that multi-stakeholder models of governance can
contribute to better deliberation and greater institutional
effectiveness. Some of the advantages of civil society participation
in governance appear to be higher levels of public credibility,
institutional transparency, deeper deliberation within the
institution, stronger connections to diverse stakeholders outside of
the institution, and higher levels of overall institutional
effectiveness.
Civil society groups often have great credibility in key areas in
which international institutions operate. According to surveys
measuring public trust in government institutions since 2000, nongovernmental organizations perform better than governments,
business, and the media in providing credible information on
environment, health, and human rights. 104 On the issue of public
credibility, NGOs are surpassing all other institutions in many
parts of the world. 105 Many inter-governmental organizations now
face persistent criticism for their perceived lack of accountability
and responsiveness. 106 The legitimacy of the objectives and norms
put forward by international institutions are often linked to the
perceived legitimacy of the institutions themselves and their
governance structures. 107
104 See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 62, at 21 (commenting that NGOs/CSOs
enjoy more public confidence than other institutions).
105 See TERRY MACDONALD, GLOBAL STAKEHOLDER DEMOCRACY: POWER AND
REPRESENTATION BEYOND LIBERAL STATES 3 (2008) (“The growing influence of
NGOs is underpinned by their perceived legitimacy, and this derives to some
degree from their claims to serve as democratic representative of global
peoples.”).
106 See BARNETT & FINNEMORE, supra note 37, at 170–72 (criticizing
international organizations for a lack of accountability and transparency,
exacerbated by the fact that member nations often have a vested interest in
preserving the status quo); Asher Alkoby, Global Networks and International
Environmental Lawmaking: A Discourse Approach, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 377, 402 (2008)
(discussing this criticism and concluding that “NGOs are held accountable
differently, and sometimes more effectively, than states because their actions are
monitored more directly through internal accountability.”).
107 See, e.g., Lars Thomann, The ILO, Tripartism, and NGOs: Do Too Many Cooks
Really Spoil the Broth?, in CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE: A CURE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT? 71, 73 (Jens Steffek et al. eds.,
2008) (“The ILO and its tripartite structure can . . . claim a high level of legitimacy,
because the active participation of non-governmental actors is institutionalized.”).
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In terms of institutional transparency, the example of the
Global Fund helps to give context to the broader observation that
civil society participation improves the overall transparency of
international institutions. 108 Civil society participation in the
Global Fund’s board contributed to the adoption of enhanced
transparency requirements, through the Global Fund Documents
Policy, and the adoption of a requirement for a formal independent
evaluation of the Fund. 109 Additionally, civil society involvement
on the Board has contributed to a substantial revision of the
guidelines for ensuring effective multi-stakeholder involvement in
country-level
processes,
proposals,
and
program
implementation. 110
Involving civil society groups in the formal decision-making
process within international institutions can sometimes lead to
more robust deliberation, and thereby contribute to improved
decision-making. 111 Looking at the World Trade Organization,
Dan Esty highlights the contribution of competing ideas offered by
civil society which can be applied to many other institutions: “An
NGO-enriched WTO decision process would offer better
competition for national governments in the search for optimal
policies.” 112 The expansion of participation in the international
environmental arena has been seen to provide particular benefits in

108 See Grigorescu, supra note 29, at 625 (suggesting that intergovernmental
organizations can become more accountable and legitimate through increased
transparency).
109 See THE INT’L CTR. FOR RES. ON WOMEN, CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN
GLOBAL FUND GOVERNANCE: WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE? PRELIMINARY
RESEARCH FINDINGS 2–3 (2004), available at http://www.theglobalfund.org
/documents/library/studies/position_papers/PP_PS2_full.pdf
(commenting
that civil society has played a significant role in the decision-making and policy
choices of the Global Fund).
110 See THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA, AN
EVOLVING PARTNERSHIP: THE GLOBAL FUND AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST
AIDS,
TUBERCULOSIS
AND
MALARIA
11
(2007),
available
at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/publications/other/evolvingpartnership/
(recommending several strategies designed to insure greater civil society
participation in program implementation and decision-making activities).
111 See Alkoby, supra note 106, at 388 (discussing the efficacy of a transparent
and inclusive negotiating process, particularly in multi-actor situations).
112 Daniel C. Esty, Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade
Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 123, 137
(1998).
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policy formulation because of the specific expertise of non-state
actors. 113
In addition, civil society actors can sometimes provide a longterm perspective on certain challenges precisely because they are
less constrained than many state actors. Less affected by the
demands and limitations of shorter-term political bargaining in
which governments must constantly engage, civil society groups
can often afford to take a longer-term view of important policy
questions. NGOs seek to compete for the public conscience, and
prod governments to consider broader perspectives and focus on
pressing transnational issues. 114
Civil society can also foster deliberation beyond the boundaries
of the boardrooms of international institutions. By communicating
with local-stakeholders and shaping global media interest, nonstate actors can function as a “‘transmission belt’ between a global
citizenry and the institutions of global governance.” 115 Civil
society groups can transport issues and concerns from local
stakeholders that might not otherwise reach relevant international
institutions. 116 Even when the arguments of non-state actors do
not prevail within these institutions, the incorporation of civil
society groups in the governance of international institutions can

113 See Raustiala, supra note 2, at 558–59 (explaining that one of the benefits is
that NGOs devote substantial efforts and resources to research and development
which afford governments reasonably accurate, efficacious, and creative policy
advice).
114 See Ann M. Florini, Transnational Civil Society, in GLOBAL CITIZEN ACTION
29 (Michael Edwards & John Gaventa eds., 2001).
115 Jens Steffek & Patrizia Nanz, Emergent Patterns of Civil Society Participation
in Global and European Governance, in CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: A CURE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT? 1, 3 (Jens Steffek
et al. eds., 2008); see also Bexell et al., supra note 80, at 86–87 (noting that NGOs and
other transnational actors responsive to citizens as part of their design are thus
more able to integrate “citizen concerns into the debate and onto the agenda”).
116 See Patrizia Nanz & Jens Steffek, Deliberation and Democracy in Global
Governance: The Role of Civil Society, in PARTICIPATION FOR SUSTAINABILITY IN TRADE
61, 61 (Sophie Thoyer & Benoît Martimort-Asso eds., 2007) (arguing that
deliberation between civil society and international organizations “may enhance
the rationality and legitimacy of political decisions made beyond the nation
state”); see also Michael Zürn, Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State: The
EU and Other International Institutions, 6 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 183, 198 (2000)
(discussing the power of NGOs to form networks crossing through national
borders).
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expand deliberation beyond the institution itself to a broader array
of stakeholders engaged in the policy dialogue. 117
Another important reason for including civil society in the
governance of international institutions is the possibility that their
participation can enhance the impact of a given institution in
implementing its programs and advancing its mission. 118 In the
context of increasingly complex global challenges, the capacity for
international institutions to solve problems is likely to become an
increasingly important test of their legitimacy. Although it is a
difficult issue to definitively resolve, there is a growing body of
evidence that strongly suggests that more participatory approaches
can yield better results, particularly in the field of development. 119
There is substantial evidence for this conclusion concerning the
link between civil society participation and institutional
effectiveness from the World Bank. 120 A 1998 study of World
Bank-supported projects found that a majority of projects
demonstrated the “potential for success because their preparation
and early implementation . . . are highly participatory.” 121 Another
study of participatory processes in Bank-assisted projects
completed in 2001 concluded that “participation of primary and
secondary stakeholders (including CSOs) increased significantly
during the mid-1990s, and the resulting benefits have been
117 See THE ADVISORY GROUP, CIVIL SOCIETY AND AID EFFECTIVENESS: A
SYNTHESIS OF ADVISORY GROUP REGIONAL CONSULTATIONS AND RELATED PROCESSES
JANUARY–DECEMBER 2007, at 6 (2008), available at http://siteresources
.worldbank.org/ACCRAEXT/Resources/4700790-1208545462880/AG-CSSynthisis-of-Consultations.pdf (commenting that NGOs are perceived as being a
natural outgrowth of societies with free association of individuals); Steffek &
Nanz, supra note 115, at 28 (stating that CSOs improve the accessibility of
international governance, but are not considered to have a strong and vibrant
role).
118 See Liesbet Steer & Cecilie Wathne, Donor Financing of Basic Education:
Opportunities and Constraints, 30 INT’L J. EDUC. DEV. 472, 476 (2010) (noting the
success of civil society involvement in catalyzing resources for the Global Fund
for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria).
119 See Kennedy M. Maranga, The Evolving Role of NGOs in Global
Governance 8 (July 28, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1650163 (discussing the
increased legitimacy and effectiveness of NGOs when allowing themselves to be
held accountable to the public).
120 See Schlemmer-Schulte, supra note 65, at 411 (arguing that the World
Bank’s policy can be greatly shifted by a system of accountability to civil society).
121 CHRISTOPHER GIBBS ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, NONGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN WORLD BANK-SUPPORTED PROJECTS: A REVIEW 32 (1999).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

GARTNER.DOC

626

1/13/2011 7:04 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 32:2

significant.” 122 A more recent study by the Bank found that civil
society consultation in the development of country assistance
strategies could improve the overall quality of these strategies. 123
Analysis of the World Bank’s portfolio performance reports also
indicates that NGO involvement can lower the risk of poor
performance and that civil society participation can have a
significant impact on effectiveness. 124
Since a strong and engaged civil society has been found to
improve the delivery of public services, it is not surprising that
more participatory approaches to service delivery often yield
substantial improvements. 125 Some of the best aid projects that
demonstrate a capacity to improve the delivery of services in the
public sector involve civil society participation. 126 According to
one recent study, examining projects in 49 countries, projects were
successful 62% of the time when participation was a goal.
Conversely, only 10% were successful when participation was not
a goal. 127 One of the strongest reasons for the inclusion of civil
society groups in the governance of many twenty-first century
international institutions is their potential to contribute to resource
mobilization. Many of the institutions with the highest levels of
civil society participation in governance—in areas such as global

THE WORLD BANK, supra note 62, at 7.
See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK-CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT: REVIEW OF
FISCAL YEARS 2002–2004, at 53 (2005) (commenting that cooperation between the
World Bank and civil society could lead to greater development aid efficiency).
124 See Schlemmer-Schulte, supra note 65, at 411 (concluding that the World
Bank’s own reports indicate improved efficiency through NGO involvement).
125 See THE WORLD BANK, ASSESSING AID: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN’T, AND
WHY 3 (1998) (“An active civil society improves public services. One good idea that
many projects have supported in recent years is a participatory approach to
service delivery, often resulting in huge improvements. The best aid projects
support initiatives that change the way the public sector does business.”); see also
Kent Buse & Gill Walt, The World Health Organization and Global Public-Private
Health Partnerships: In Search of ‘Good’ Global Health Governance, in PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 169, 174 (Michael R. Reich ed., 2002).
126 See THE ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 117, at 8 (“As CSOs develop
relationships of trust with communities through the delivery of particular
programs (whether government-initiated or not), they can go further to empower
communities to seek out a full range of services from their governments.”).
127 Jonathan Isham et al., Does Participation Improve Performance? Establishing
Causality with Subjective Data, 9 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 175, 185–86 (1995).
122
123
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health—have been among the most successful in the last decade in
mobilizing an expansion of overall institutional resources. 128
One of the strongest examples of the correlation between
broader participatory governance and increased performance is the
Global Fund, both in terms of its resource mobilization and its
programmatic achievements. 129 Within a few years of its creation,
the Global Fund was already a multi-billion dollar a year venture
because of its success in mobilizing resources from donor
countries. In less than five years, it grew its portfolio to $5.5
billion, invested in 131 countries. 130 For the last several years, the
Fund has mobilized resources in excess of $3 billion each year,
despite increasing demands on scarce donor resources. 131 One of
the keys to its success as a financing mechanism lies in the
development of engaged and empowered constituencies in donor
countries that are invested in the institution and linked into its
governance structure. 132
Even more impressive are some of the results of the Global
Fund on the ground, which are consistent with the growing
128 A 2002 McKinsey & Co. study of thirty global health alliances concluded
that upwards of 80% of public health alliances appeared to be functioning, as
opposed to the private sector’s success rate of 50%. The report defined success “as
accelerating, improving, or reducing the cost of, initiatives aimed at reducing
disease burden, by comparison with what could be accomplished by bodies acting
individually in a ‘solitary approach.’” KAREN CAINES ET AL., ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF
GLOBAL HEALTH PARTNERSHIPS 10 (2004), available at http://www.theglobalfund
.org/documents/library/studies/integrated_evaluations/GHP_Synthesis_Report.pdf; see also
Rene Loewenson, Civil Society Influence on Global Health Policy 9 (Apr. 2003)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the World Health Organization), available
at http://www.tarsc.org/WHOCSI/pdf /WHOTARSC4.pdf (reporting that CSOs
engaging governments and international organizations “have yielded benefits for
all players within policy processes through reducing conflict, facilitating
communication and bringing new expertise into policy processes”).
129 For a general account of the success of the Global Fund and its
engagement with civil society, see THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS
AND MALARIA, AN EVOLVING PARTNERSHIP: THE GLOBAL FUND AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN
THE FIGHT AGAINST AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA (2007), available at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/publications/brochures/evolvingpa
rtnership/AnEvolvingPartnership_en.pdf.
130 See Richard G.A. Feachem & Oliver J. Sabot, An Examination of the Global
Fund at 5 Years, 368 LANCET 537, 537 (2006) (offering an overview of the Global
Fund’s investment portfolio).
131 Pledges and Contributions, GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND
MALARIA, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/pledges/ (last visited Nov. 12,
2010).
132 See id. (listing the Global Fund’s current pledges and contributions).
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literature on the link between participation and effectiveness in
development. As of the end of 2009, the Global Fund was
providing financing for treatment for 2.5 million people suffering
from AIDS. 133 Additionally, it provided treatment to some 6
million people living with active tuberculosis, leading to a
reduction in tuberculosis prevalence and mortality in many target
countries. 134 It also distributed 104 million insecticide-treated bed
nets to prevent the spread of malaria, and provided 57% of
international disbursements for malaria control, as of 2008. 135 The
Fund estimates that its combined efforts have contributed to
preventing some 4.9 million deaths. 136
Increasingly, many twenty-first century institutions that
have adopted multi-stakeholder governance models are
demonstrating impressive results that are challenging the
traditional role of some of the leading twentieth century
institutions.
Improved institutional transparency, deeper
engagement with diverse societal actors, public confidence and
support for expanded resource mobilization, and programmatic
impact are all characteristic of many of these multi-stakeholder
institutions.
The insights that have been gained from the experience of this
new generation of institutions have not yet been adequately
incorporated into the theoretical debates over the design of
international institutions. At issue is not just the question of
whether civil society should play a meaningful role in the
governance of international institutions, but also the more
challenging question of how best to incorporate non-state actors in
ways that will maximize their contribution and minimize the risks
that so many critics have highlighted. It is this latter question that
is the focus of the next section, which argues in favor of
incorporating the insights from associative democracy theorists,
133 See THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA, THE
GLOBAL FUND 2010: INNOVATION AND IMPACT RESULTS SUMMARY 1 (2010), available at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/replenishment/2010/Progress_Repo
rt_Summary_2010_en.pdf (tallying the total number of HIV/AIDS patients who
received Global Fund financed antiretroviral therapy in 2009).
134 See id. at 2 (estimating the number of tuberculosis patients who received
treatment through Global Fund financed programs in 2009).
135 See id.
136 See id. (estimating the total number of lives saved through the Global
Fund’s collective efforts as of December 2009).
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and adopting constituency models as a core part of multistakeholder governance.
4.

BEYOND THE MONOPOLY OF STATES

The models of multi-stakeholder governance incorporated in
twenty-first century international institutions challenge many
prevailing assumptions about the proper role of states and nonstate actors in the international arena. While the growing evidence
regarding the effectiveness of including civil society within formal
governance is a powerful response to critics of civil society
participation, their concerns can nonetheless prove invaluable to
the design of these institutions. The insights of associative
democracy theorists offer a new way to think about how diverse
stakeholders might be organized to contribute to the core mission
of many international institutions. Constituency models of civil
society participation hold great promise in leveraging the broader
contribution of non-state actors while reducing the risk of narrow
or self-interested actors who might take advantage of more
participatory models of governance.
One of the core challenges for any model of multi-stakeholder
governance is to guard against non-state actors pursuing a narrow
or self-interested agenda that does not reflect the concerns of the
wider constituencies from which they have emerged. Many of
these dynamics are not new or even unique to the international
arena, but have instead been prominent features in long-standing
debates over the role of diverse actors in the context of national or
local governance. A rich literature on associative democracy and
participatory governance offers new insights that can be applied to
the global challenge of structuring international institutions.
When it comes to overcoming the risks of empowering private
actors, there is a longstanding literature that highlights the
“mischiefs of faction” that can be produced by private interests. 137
The risk—which has been highlighted by critics of civil society
participation—is that unaccountable actors will be empowered
through expanded participation. 138 However, there is also a
137 See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 72–79 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961). Cf. Alkoby, supra note 106, at 400 (describing the dangers of
empowering NGOs because of concerns regarding their lack of accountability).
138 See Scholte, supra note 42, at 231 (arguing that many civil groups lack
adequate standards of accountability); Marguerite A. Peeters, Participatory
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growing body of work, which highlights the positive contributions
that civil society groups—sometimes called secondary
associations—can make to further successful democratic
governance. 139
The core idea of associative democracy is that civil society
groups are capable of performing useful, democracy-enhancing
functions. 140 Conceptions of associative democracy highlight the
role of civil society groups in linking citizen participation more
closely to the exercise of public power. 141 In the national context,
scholars have highlighted the contribution that these groups can
make by providing valuable information to policymakers,
equalizing representation, catalyzing citizen education, and
contributing to problem solving. Associations can provide a
mechanism for less powerful groups to participate in governance,
serve as “schools of democracy,” and facilitate alternative forms of
governance focused on problem-solving. 142 However, there are
several key qualitative features of groups that are viewed as
necessary conditions for enabling these valuable contributions,
including the accountability relationships between leadership and
members, the degree to which the group fully encompasses the
affected population, and the distribution of power and modes of
interaction across different groups. 143 These qualitative features,
such as breadth of the overall constituency, the relationships
between leaders and the broader constituency, and the interaction
between different constituencies, are also very relevant in
evaluating civil society participation within international
institutions.
Building upon this work on associative democracy, recent
scholarship has examined innovative approaches to promoting
Democracy in the New Europe: A Critical Analysis 3 (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Pol’y
Res.), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040402_20030611_Peeters.pdf
(arguing that NGOs should demonstrate their representativeness and the role of
members in decision-making).
139 See Archon Fung, Associations and Democracy: Between Theories, Hopes and
Realities 29 ANN. REV. SOCIOL. 515, 515–16 (2003); see also Cohen & Rogers, supra
note 6, at 395 (recognizing some of the positive contributions that civil society
groups can make to improving governance).
140 See Cohen & Rogers, supra note 6, at 424.
141 See Fung supra note 139, at 533.
142 See id. at 424–25.
143 See id. at 428.
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participatory democracy and governance, in which ordinary
citizens directly engage in policymaking. 144 The core insight
motivating this literature is the observation that existing
mechanisms of political representation are increasingly unable to
foster adequate citizen involvement and reach consensus on major
policy challenges. 145 Archon Fung and Erik Olin-Wright have
introduced the idea of “empowered deliberative democracy,”
which seeks to link expanded participation with improved
They argue that
deliberation and citizen empowerment. 146
“empowered deliberative democracy” works when people focus
on specific tangible problems that involve ordinary people and
engage in the deliberative design of solutions to such problems.147
This model suggests the devolution of public decision authority to
local units of governance. However, the focus on specific areas of
public problem solving in this conception is consistent with the
approach of many twenty-first century international institutions.
At the same time, a rough equality of power in the context of
participation by citizens and government officials is seen in this
literature as crucial to enabling meaningful deliberation. 148 Just as
in the international context, the benefits of expanded participation
also extend to the likelihood of heightened commitment by diverse
actors to effectively implement decisions. 149
Central to all of these models is the underlying conception of
deliberation and its role in effective governance. 150 Deliberation by
itself is not necessarily either democratic or reflective of a wide
range of views and stakeholders. As Josh Cohen and Charles Sabel
put it: “[D]eliberation, understood as reasoning about how best to
144 For a discussion of participatory democracy, see generally Jeffrey D.
Hilmer, The State of Participatory Democratic Theory, 32 NEW POL. SCI. 43 (2010).
145 See Fung & Wright, supra note 6, at 5.
146 Id. at 7.
147 See id. at 14; Mikael Wigell, Multi-Stakeholder Cooperation in Global
Governance 31 (Finnish Inst. of Int’l Aff., Working Paper No. 58, 2008) (“Multistakeholder initiatives help to broaden discussion and identify global public needs.”)
(emphasis in original).
148 See, e.g., Fung & Wright, supra note 6, at 24.
149 See id. at 26 (arguing that empowered participatory governance
contributes to “generate and adopt proposals that enjoy broad consensus
support”).
150 See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a
Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1291 (2001) (discussing the importance of
deliberation and its role in institutional design).
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address a practical problem, is not intrinsically democratic: it can
be conducted within cloistered bodies that make fateful choices,
but are inattentive to the views or the interests of large numbers of
affected parties . . . .” 151 Yet, there is an important literature which
suggests that deliberation is enhanced by the process of assessing
While the critique of multi-stakeholder
divergent views. 152
participation in the governance of international institutions focuses
on how diverse views can make achieving consensus more
difficult, recent literature on deliberation emphasizes the
importance of the process of the discussion and elaboration of
difference. 153
Visions of deliberation going back to at least John Stuart Mill
have focused on its role in encouraging deliberants to “weigh
interests not his own . . . .” 154 Or, as Amy Gutmann and Dennis
Thompson put it, participants in deliberations “are more likely to
take a broader view of issues . . . in a process in which moral
arguments are taken seriously . . . .” 155 Too frequently, the
governance of international institutions fails to foster this type of
deliberation, in part because of the limited range of actors and
views that participate in the process. Civil society participation has
the potential to ensure not only that different views will be
weighed, but also that expanded consideration will be given to
views which are less constrained by short-term political constraints
and potentially more reflective of longer-term interests.
Some scholars equate civil society participation in the
governance of international institutions with corporatist
democracy’s structures for involving non-state actors with elected
officials. Under this view, civil society participation should be
151 Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Sovereignty and Solidarity: EU and US, in
PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 157, 169 (Karl-Heinz Ladeur
ed., 2004).
152 See Esty, supra note 2, at 1520.
153 See Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New
Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU, in EXPERIMENTALIST
GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: TOWARDS A NEW ARCHITECTURE 1, 8
(Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 2010) (noting that new forms of
deliberation that account for and incorporate a diversity of views can open up
“new possibilities for democratization of decision making”).
154 JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 79
(1882).
155 AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 42
(1996).
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organized around a model of intermediate associations and ensure
that relevant associations with legitimate claims to representing the
largest numbers of people will be selected for participation. Yet
strictly corporatist models pose significant challenges at the
international level in terms of how such organizations would be
selected, and the risk that rigidities could evolve that would
exclude emerging stakeholders. 156 One formulation for expanding
participation that responds to this concern is the idea of striving for
the “fullest possible participation and representation of those
affected.” 157
The focus, in this view, is not just on the
representative basis for civil society participation, but also on its
connection to those most directly impacted by the work of a given
institution.
The central challenge to achieving these potential benefits
resulting from multi-stakeholder governance is structuring
participation in ways that limit the risks of enhancing the power of
unrepresentative or parochial interests while maximizing the
possibility that diverse stakeholders will be meaningful
contributors to deliberation, rather than merely symbolic
participants. 158 Constituency models of governance can foster both
enhanced accountability and improved deliberation within these
institutions. While most major international institutions now
provide for some form of consultation with civil society groups,
the roles of such organizations are often extremely limited. If
models of consultation were the dominant approach for most of
the twentieth century, new models of full participation in
governance are increasingly common features of twenty-first
century institutions.

156 See Francesca Bignami, Civil Society and International Organizations: A
Liberal Framework for Global Governance 62–64 (Duke L. Faculty Scholarship, Paper
No. 1126, 2007), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty
_scholarship/1126; Ottaway, supra note 11, at 266.
157 Gráinne de Búrca, Developing Democracy Beyond the State, 46 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 221, 227 (2008).
158 See Bexell et al., supra note 80, at 89–90 (noting that while transnational
partnerships between state and non-state actors could potentially promote
meaningful participation, learning, and dialogue, they are limited by unequal
bargaining positions).
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4.1. Reconciling Theory and Practice
The next Section seeks to sketch out an approach to civil society
participation that promotes both meaningful and accountable
participation in the governance of international institutions. The
first hurdle is to identify the essential elements of the structure of
governance without which civil society participation is unlikely to
be robust and risks becoming merely symbolic. The challenge of
fostering accountable and effective multi-stakeholder institutions is
closely tied to the way in which the participation of non-state
actors is structured. Among the most successful models have been
those which require civil society representation to be grounded in
constituencies of diverse and encompassing organizations rather
than vested in a single individual or organization. 159 In this
Section, these different models for structuring civil society
participation within existing institutions are distilled in order to
identify the structural features of a framework that fosters more
deliberative and effective civil society participation in international
institutions.
Models of multi-stakeholder governance still vary a great
deal—from participation in governing boards without voting
rights, to full participation in governance. Many governments,
some scholars, and even some civil society groups traditionally
resist the idea of allocating voting status to civil society groups
within international institutions. Yet it is hard to imagine a true
partnership in any governing context in which some have voting
rights and others do not. This is consistent with the findings of
work on local-level participatory governance in which a rough
equality of power between citizens and official experts is seen as
crucial to fostering meaningful deliberation. 160 There also appear
to be inevitable limits to the depth of partnership and the sense of
accountability for governance in models in which NGOs serve as
observers rather than full participants.
159 Civil society constituencies are defined somewhat differently within
different institutions but are often divided within multi-stakeholder institutions
between NGOs from the global North and those from the global South. The
United Nations has defined its “major groups” to include constituencies such as
trade unions, youth, women, business, and scientific experts. Constituency
models are also potentially valuable for structuring the participation of other
types of non-state actors, such as the private sector, which are not the focus of this
paper.
160 See Fung & Wright, supra note 6, at 13–14.
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While a number of twenty-first century institutions allocate just
one seat to civil society, even on a relatively large board, an
increasing number of institutions now allocate seats to civil society
groups from the global North and South. 161 In addition, some of
these institutions designate specific seats for representatives of the
communities most directly affected by the work of the institution,
as well as representatives from foundations, individual experts,
and representatives from the private sector. 162 The representation
of both Northern and Southern actors is significant in the context
of concerns that civil society participation in governance might
accentuate the imbalances of representation between different
regions of the world.
Models of civil society participation in the governance of
international institutions that merely include an individual
representative are much weaker than models of constituency
representation at incorporating diverse voices, preventing cooptation, and promoting accountability. In contrast to a single
individual being solely responsible for representing the views of a
multifaceted sector, constituency models involve a delegation
which jointly makes key policy decisions and also serves as a
forum for learning for future and alternate board members.
As with associative democracy in national contexts, the degree
to which those representing civil society actually reflect the views
of the affected population and the existence of accountability
mechanisms for leaders are key factors in shaping the contribution
of civil society participation. 163 Some scholars have suggested that
the key challenge is to find ways to structure voice in order to
“combat, rather than accentuate, existing . . . inequalities.” 164

161 See INT’L CTR. FOR RES. ON WOMEN, supra note 109, at 1 (noting the vigorous
participation of civil society groups from Northern and Southern regions on The
Global Fund’s Board in contrast to limited participation by civil society
representatives at the United Nations).
162 For example, The Global Fund board includes a seat for a delegation of
NGOs representative of people living with AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. Board
Delegations’ Contact Information, THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS
AND MALARIA, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/board/delegations/ (last
visited Nov. 22, 2010).
163 See Cohen & Rogers, supra note 6, at 395.
164 Michael Edwards, Introduction to GLOBAL CITIZEN ACTION 1, 7 (Michael
Edwards & John Gaventa eds., 2001).
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In the cases of The Global Fund and more recently GAVI, the
work of the constituency is facilitated by a communications focal
point to ensure broad and meaningful participation by various
stakeholders. 165 The delegation serves as a resource and forcemultiplier for a single board member as well as a forum for
deliberation and a potential check on a board member who might
not adequately represent the views of a diverse constituency. The
constituency model is not unique to global health institutions as it
has been adopted by other development institutions and could
plausibly be applied to international institutions in a range of
sectors.
Observer status for non-state actors is much less likely to
translate into a significant role within the governance of
international institutions because it suggests that their role is to
watch rather than to participate in the deliberations of these
institutions. There are examples of institutions in which non-state
actors are granted the rights and responsibilities of membership
without a formal vote. 166 While this distinction matters much less
in processes that are truly consensus based, there always remains
the possibility of a deadlock in consensus, and if there is any role
for formal voting then the question of whether civil society holds
voting rights becomes much more significant.
Another key structural feature to ensure meaningful civil
society participation in the governance of international institutions
is the balance of representation within these structures. The
allocation of just one single seat to non-state actors or even to
global civil society actors is often a recipe for symbolic but not
meaningful participation. The concern is both that any single voice
would be much more likely to be marginalized within an
otherwise inter-governmental institution and also that a single seat

165 See GAVI ALLIANCE, MEETING REPORT: GAVI ALLIANCE CIVIL SOCIETY
MEETING (Nov. 21, 2009), http://www.gavialliance.org/resources/Report_on
_Gavi_CSO_Day_21_Hanoi.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2010) (highlighting GAVI’s
intent to hire an independent communications focal point in order to support civil
society organizations).
166 See, e.g., GLOBAL AGRIC. & FOOD SEC. PROGRAM, GLOBAL AGRICULTURE AND
FOOD SECURITY PROGRAM (GAFSP) GOVERNANCE DOCUMENT, 2(i) (2010), available at
http://www.gafspfund.org/gafsp/sites/gafspfund.org/files/Documents/Gover
nanceDocument.pdf (listing the steering committee members which are made up
of both voting and non-voting members).
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would not allow for the inclusion of both those from the Northern
and Southern Hemispheres. Civil society groups in the South too
often lack any role in the governance of international institutions
while groups in the North often have greater resources to influence
other actors within these institutions. As a result, to include one
and not both of these actors is much more likely to result in
participation that is either unbalanced or insufficiently heard.
No less important than the challenge of fostering full
participation by civil society actors is that of promoting the
accountability and effectiveness of these actors. Any model in
which individuals disconnected from a broader constituency
structure are the sole participants risks inadequate accountability.
Constituency models which link representation to a broader
delegation and encompass a diverse group of stakeholders are
much more likely to reflect the views of the broader constituency.
A major challenge is defining which groups should be included
and excluded from participation in a given constituency. In
defining the breadth of a given constituency, the principle of selforganization is central for many institutions. 167 A risk this poses is
that early participants will become entrenched in their roles and
prevent the involvement of new groups. Limited terms and
mechanisms for promoting new leadership are both critical to
limiting the likelihood of ossification. Delegations can provide a
forum for the development of new leadership within the
constituency and, when necessary, for accountability mechanisms
for board representatives who might be pursuing narrow interests.
Just as important as ensuring accountability for non-state actors
in the governance of international institutions, is fostering the
capacity for these stakeholders to effectively participate. One of
the models that has proven most effective to promote
communication within diverse and geographically dispersed
delegations and for supporting the capacity of individual
participants is the creation of a designated communications focal
point for the delegation. 168 The key role is to facilitate deliberation,
See THE GLOBAL FUND FOR AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA, GUIDELINES
CONSTITUENCY PROCESS, available at http://www.theglobalfund.org
/documents/publications/other/ConstituencyProcesses/ConstituencyProcesses
Guidelines_en.pdf (discussing constituency formation and composition).
168 See id. (listing “[e]xcellent communication skills” as a key focal point); see
also GAVI Civil Society Communications Focal Point, GAVI ALLIANCE,
http://www.gavialliance.org/employment/card.php?empID=92 (last visited Nov. 22,
167
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preparation, and engagement with other board members rather
than to replace or bypass the delegation and its representatives on
the board. 169
A new framework for evaluating the participation by civil
society in the governance of international institutions should
involve a two-part test. First, the relevant international institution
should be structured in such a way as to foster effective
participation and maximize the contribution of civil society actors
to the mission of the institution. The consultative models of most
twentieth century institutions are unlikely to meet this test and
observer models will have difficulty doing so as well because
neither approach is as likely to catalyze the full contribution of civil
society actors. Second, civil society participation should be
designed to maximize the accountability of civil society actors to a
broad constituency of affected stakeholders. Models in which
disconnected individuals from NGOs serve on boards would not
meet this test, and models that involve the selection of a single
large or well-known NGO are also unlikely to meet this test.
For each of these two critical dimensions, the effective
participation and accountability of civil society, three minimum
conditions can serve as benchmarks in evaluating civil society
participation. The minimum conditions for effective participation
by civil society in the governance of international institutions are:
1) full membership as part of the governing body, which usually
but not always will involve some form of voting rights; 2)
participation by more than a single representative; and 3) the
inclusion of both Southern and Northern stakeholders. The
minimum conditions for accountability for civil society
participation within international institutions are: 1) the existence
of a constituency-based approach to participation; 2) a civil society
delegation that encompasses a diverse range of stakeholders,
including those most affected; and 3) a communications focal point
to facilitate deliberation and communication within the delegation.
This approach to evaluating civil society participation in the
governance of international institutions treats effective and
2010) (posting an employment opportunity specifically for a communications
focal point to develop communications fools for the GAVI Alliance).
169 See GAVI Civil Society Communications Focal Point, supra note 168
(discussing the purpose and main responsibilities of the communications focal
point).
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accountable participation as equally important ultimate objectives.
Voting rights without a constituency based model would empower
some non-state actors, but not necessarily leverage the broader
contribution from the sector that contributes to the overall quality
of decision-making and institutional effectiveness. Robust civil
society participation depends on creating enough room at the
governance table for non-state actors to make a major contribution
and ensuring enough connection to a broader constituency so that
this contribution is accountable and catalytic of wider efforts
among diverse stakeholders.
5.

CONCLUSION

In the twenty-first century, a wide range of complex global
challenges will require unprecedented levels of global cooperation
between states and non-state actors. Yet, few leading international
institutions today are designed to effectively leverage the
resources, ingenuity, and connectivity of diverse societal actors.
While some scholars maintain the “monopoly of states” view that
civil society should not meaningfully participate in the governance
of international institutions, a new generation of multi-stakeholder
institutions points toward a new approach to understanding the
relationship between non-state actors and international
institutions.
The core challenge to improving the performance of
international institutions in meeting contemporary global
challenges, as Ernest Haas explained, is that most international
institutions are much better at adapting than engaging in
meaningful learning processes: “Adaptive behavior is common,
whereas true learning is rare. The very nature of institutions is
such that the dice are loaded in favor of the less demanding
behavior associated with adaptation.” 170 Haas’ point and the
experience of the leading international institutions established in
the twentieth century both strongly suggest that if the design of
these institutions is not inclusive from the beginning, the
opportunities for transformation of governance within existing
institutions may be quite limited.

170 ERNST B. HAAS, WHEN KNOWLEDGE IS POWER: THREE MODELS OF CHANGE IN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 37 (1990).
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Multi-stakeholder approaches to governance could be adopted
within a wide range of international institutions. Yet it also may be
the case that these models will be most successful in institutions
which are more focused on specific tangible problems, which make
it easier to involve non-state actors in deliberation over the
solutions to those problems. For this reason, global health and
development institutions have proven to be particularly fertile
ground for innovations with respect to civil society participation in
governance. Certainly, the role of these institutions in providing
global public goods highlights the importance of effective
implementation that engages diverse stakeholders. Nonetheless,
even for many institutions with a very different focus and mission,
the benefits of broadened participation could remain valuable in
improving deliberation and enlisting the contributions of diverse
societal actors. Future research on a wider range of sectors and
diverse institutional models of civil society participation will be
extremely valuable in demonstrating the possibility and limits of
multi-stakeholder governance.
In responding to many global challenges, international
institutions may ultimately be more successful by expanding
multi-stakeholder involvement in their governance structures.
Evidence from a number of twenty-first century institutions
suggests that greater civil society participation can lead to
enhanced transparency, more effective deliberation, greater public
credibility, and more effective implementation of programs. Yet it
remains possible that expanded participation in the governance of
international institutions in some contexts may diminish
institutional effectiveness. 171 Constituency models of participation
may offer a pathway to better harness the potential contribution of
civil society and reduce such tradeoffs. Further research is needed
to better explore the interplay between expanded participation and
institutional effectiveness within diverse institutions and the
171 See generally JONATHAN G.S. KOPPELL, WORLD RULE: ACCOUNTABILITY,
LEGITIMACY, AND THE DESIGN OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2010) (arguing that there
exists a tradeoff between expanding participation in governance and building and
maintaining what he terms the authority of international institutions, in
regulatory areas including the environment). But see Kal Raustiala, Nonstate
Actors in the Global Climate Regime, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE 95, 115–16 (MIT Press, 2001) (arguing that the participation of
NGOs in formal international cooperation enhances the ability of states to
regulate new areas in the environmental context).
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mechanisms through which different models of participation
might alter these dynamics.
It is unlikely that states alone will be able to respond to the
greatest challenges of the twenty-first century.
Even with
enhanced cooperation between states, it is increasingly clear that
non-state actors are essential to responding to key challenges
across a wide range of issues. Although it is possible to imagine
expanded cooperation between state and non-state actors without
a fundamental shift toward multi-stakeholder governance, it may
prove difficult for many international institutions to be successful
and accountable in the long-run without governance structures
that catalyze the contributions of civil society actors.
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